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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This petition for rehearing involves the questions of 
whether Count II of plaintiff's complaint states a valid 
third party beneficiary action against defendant archi-
tect Harold K. Beecher and Associates, a Utah corpora-
tion,-an issue which the Court has not decided, and 
whether Count I of plaintiff's complaint is fatally defec-
tive in failing to plead the duty of care and the breach 
thereof by said defendant according to the standard of 
2 
learning, skill and care customarily practiced by arch-
itects practicing in the vicinity where the defendant 
practices? 
DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING 
This Honorable Court has decided the case against the 
defendant without resolving the above two issues. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Your petitioner seeks to have the Court reason the case 
on traditional contract and tort law which is the basis of 
decision in the cases cited by the Court when the partic-
ular fact situations are carefully analyzed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case which should be determinative 
on rehearing are: first, plaintiff did not plead that the 
architect had a right or a duty to provide written specifi-
cations which would make definite the degree of sloping 
and/or shoring of the temporary trench; second, no speci-
fications of the degree of sloping or of the kind and extent 
of shoring of the excavation exist in this case, which 
would make definitive the method and manner of exca- 1 
vation to be followed by the contractor; third, the tempor-
ary excavation was not adjacent to buildings which would 
allow the application of inherently dangerous doctrine of 
tort law; sixth, there was no special additional contract 
for an extra fee to the architect to write out specifications 
for shoring and to agree to enforce compliance with such 
definite specifications; seventh, and of controlling im-
portance, the authority, duty and manner of ordering a , 
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work stoppage, if any, by the architect's participation, is 
spelled out with limitations on the architect in paragraph 
13 of the architect's agency agreement with the owners 
requiring not unilateral action by the architect but bi-
lateral action by owner and architect or unilateral action 
by the owners. See Exhibit "A" of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The architect has made no subscribed agreement to an-
swer for the misfeasance of the contractor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ARCHITECT AND ITS EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE 
GRANTED THIRD PARTY IMMUNITY UNLESS THE 
COURT FINDS A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
AGREEMENT SUBSCRIBED BY THE ARCHITECT TO 
ANSWER FOR THE MISFEASANCE OF THE CON-
TRACTOR WHICH THE COURT HAS NOT YET 
FOUND. 
Until the amendment of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act of 1945, an injured workman had no third party 
action. That amendment did not grant workmen on build-
ing projects a third party action for all injuries wherein a 
third party might be involved. In Cook v. Kiewit Con-
struction Company, 15 Ut. 2d 20, a case involving an al-
leged tort of misfeasance (not an alleged claim for passive 
non-feasance), Justice Crocket interpreted the legislative 
limitation on third party actions by workmen entitled to 
compensation thus: 
The-Statute-seems plainly designed to apply to 
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers 
engaged in the same endeavors. 
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A reasonable view of the fact situation would seem to 
compel the conclusion that here the architect was not a 
stranger to the employment and that the architect and 
the contractor (through and by his servants) were en-
gaged in the same endeavor. See: Defendant's original 
brief (pp. 20-27). 
Fairness to the architects of Utah and the legal pro-
fession would seem to indicate that if the Court is deter-
mined to reason to its decision simply on a non-tradi-
tional, new, humanitarian, public policy argument it 
should set out the reasons why it favors workmen and 
penalizes architects under the particular facts of this case. 
The existence or the non-existence of a third party 
beneficiary action was definitely an issue in this case. 
Defendant's counsel briefed the issue rather fully (De-
fendant's original brief, pp. 9-12 Inc.). 
The opinion of the Court fails to state whether or not 
the Court found that a third party beneficiary contract 
exists in favor of plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel failed to 
brief this issue and in effect asked the Court to find lia-
bility on the basis of some humanitarian principle rather 
than on the basis of an established rule of law. 
This plea was made by plaintiff even though the arch-
itect's agency agreement made it clear that the architect 
did not intend to make and did not make a third-party 
beneficiary contract, and even though plaintiff does not 
allege that the architect is guilty of any misfeasance or 
that the architect assumed a moral obligation which he 
then performed in a negligent manner. 
Again, if the members of the Court believe that the , 
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architect by its subscribed agreement including para-
graph 13 on SUPERVISION (which the court overlooks) 
intentionally and knowingly made a third party benefi-
ciary contract to answer for the tortious defaults of the 
contractor under the particular facts of this case, then the 
opinion should so declare. One cannot be quite sure 
whether the Court intends to hold that plaintiff's alleged 
second cause of action, Count II, does or does not allege a 
valid third party beneficiary agreement. 
We respectfully request that the Court upon rehearing 
specifically find on this issue. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S OPINION COMPLETELY OVERLOOKS 
THE FATAL NEGLECT AND OMISSION OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT TO PLEAD A BREACH OF DUTY 
OF DEFENDANT ARCHITECT ACCORDING TO THE 
STANDARD OF DUTY AND CARE GOVERNING DU-
TIES OF ARCHITECTS PRACTICING IN THE VICIN-
ITY WHERE THE DEFENDANT ARCHITECT PRAC-
TICES. 
Plaintiff's first and abandoned complaint pleaded on 
architect's duty of care properly as follows: 
That the reasonable and standard exercise of judge-
ment and care ordinarily exercised in like cases by 
reputable members of the architect's profession 
practicing in the same locality would dictate that in 
accordance with the duty specified in the authorized 
contract the work should have been shut down until 
the proper safety and precautionary measures had 
been provided. (Plaintiff's original complaint pp. 
2-3.) 
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Plaintiff's second amended complaint omits the fore-
going allegation of standard of care which is essential to 
a validly pleaded complaint. It says nothing about a duty 
to exercise a discretionary judgement which skilled arch-
itects practicing in the vicinity would exercise under the 
circumstances. It simply alleges without reference to the 
applicable legal standard of care governing architects. 
That said defendants both knew said dangerous con-
dition for many days prior to said accident and 
negligently failed to shut down the work on said 
tunnel as they had the duty and the authority to do. 
The Paxton case, infra, (which the court erroneously 
cites as supporting its opinion) approved the trial court's 
instruction regarding the standard of care required of an 
architect which reads in part as follows: 
You are not permitted arbitrarily to set up a standard 
of your own. The standard is that set up by the learn-
ing, skill and care ordinarily possessed and practiced 
by others of the same profession in the same locality 
at the same time. It follows, therefore, that the only 
way you may properly learn that standard is through 
evidence presented in this trial by other persons in 
the field of architecture called as expert witnesses. 
(259 P. 2d 934, 938). 
The Supreme Court of Illinois in its unpublished opin-
ion in the Miller Case, infra, observed that the complaint 
properly pleaded the standard of care required of an 
architect thus: 
( d) otherwise negligently and carelessly failed to 
apply to the work aforesaid the degree of skill which 
would customarily be brought to such work by com-
petent architects in and about this community. (p. 9.) 
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A California case squarely in point on the necessity of 
properly pleading an architect's duty and the breach 
thereof reads: 
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege a duty of the 
architect according to the standard of leaning, skill 
and prudence of architects practicing in the vicinity, 
nor any violation of that established standard of care 
by the architect or any of its agents in performance of 
its supervisory duties. Bourie v. Spring Valley Water 
Company, 1908, 8 Cal. App. 588, 97 P. 530. 
POINT III 
THE COURT FALLS INTO THE ERROR OF ENGAG-
ING IN UNJUSTIFIABLE JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 
WHERE NO INTERSTICE OR GAP EXISTS IN THE 
LAW GOVERNING LIABILITY OF ARCHITECTS. 
THE APPLICATION OF STARE DECISIS TO THE 
PARTICULAR FACT SITUATION IN THE NAUMAN 
CASE WILL PRODUCE AN OPPOSITE RESULT 
FROM THAT OF THE FIRST OPINION. 
Traditional law holds that an architect should not be 
held liable for the wrong of a contractor unless the sub-
scribed agreement of the architect clearly shows an intent 
to answer for the contractor's default as shown in Erhart, 
infra. 
Counsel recognize that it is only in cases of great im-
portance to social groups such as Utah architects and 
workmen on building projects that members of the Court 
can be persuaded to reconsider their legal opinions and 
attempt to do so de novo. Nevertheless, reanalysis of the 
fact situation (particularly paragraph 13 of the arch-
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itect's agreement) in the Nauman case is necessary in our 
opinion to achieve justice. Courts sometimes do reanalyze 
their opinions. This court has done so. 
In Miller V. Stuart 69 Ut. 250, the Court said: 
"This conclusion is at variance with what was said 
upon the subject in National Bank of the Republic 
V. Price 65 Ut 57 where we think this Court fell into 
error." 
Justice Cardozo gives the legal test for determining 
whether a court has been guilty of unjustifiable judicial 
legislation in coercing a group, such as architects, into 
new liabilities which they did not intend to assume and 
to which they did not understand that they were obligat-
ing themselves. 
Justice Cardozo in The Nature of the Judicial Process, 
7th ed., 1931 in Lecture III, the Judge as a Legislator pp. 
103, 113-114, and 115 writes: 
"We must keep within these interstitial limits which 
precedent and custom and the long and silent and al-
most indefinable practice of other judges through the 
centuries of the common law have set to judge-made 
innovations. But within the limits thus set, within the 
range over which choice moves, the final principle of 1 
selection for judges as for legislators, is one of fitness 
to an end." 
(p. 103) 
"Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his 
competence. No doubt the limits for the judge are 
narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills 
the open spaces in the law. How far he may go with-
out traveling beyond the walls of the interstices can-
not be staked out for him upon a chart. He must learn 
9 
it for himself as he gains the sense of fitness and 
proportion that comes with years of habitude in the 
practice of an art. Even within the gaps, restrictions 
not easy to define, but felt, however impalpable they 
may be, by every judge and lawyer, hedge and cir-
cumscribe his action. They are established by the 
traditions of the centuries, by the example of other 
judges his predecessors and his colleagues, by the 
collective judgement of the profession, and by the 
duty of adherence to the prevading spirit of the law." 
(p. 113-114.) 
"None the less, within the confines of these open 
spaces and those of precedent and tradition, choice 
moves with a freedom which stamps its action as 
creative." (p. 115.) 
Counsel respectfully represent to this Honorable Court 
that in this case there is no interstice or gap in the law. 
The established law of third party liability of architects 
to answer for the default or miscarriage of another has 
been fully and well established over the last half century. 
In the Paradoxes of Legal Science 1928 at Page 8, Car-
dozo quotes Pound as follows: 
"Much of the administration of Justice says Pound, 
is a compromise between the tendency to treat each 
case as one of generalized type of case, and the tend-
ency to treat each case as unique." 
Cases involving the law of architects are uniformly de-
cided on the special facts of each case as will be shown 
hereinafter in distinguishing the cases cited by the Court 
from the fact situation alleged in plaintiff's pleadings. 
The law which applies and should be applied to the 
above facts is that governing open excavations where 
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there are no specifications and the work is not inherently 
dangerous. The law applicable to this situation is ade-
quately brief in defendant's original brief, Pages 16-18 
citing 23 ALR 1084 in which all of the cases limit the duty 
of the architect to supervision of the details as spelled out 
in the drawings and specifications. Plaintiff's brief shows 
no contra cases except on facts inherently dangerous. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT UNJUSTIFIABLY METAMORPHOSES 
AN ALLEGED CONTRACTOR'S UNILATERAL CON-
SENT STATED IN THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT 
TO WHICH THE ARCHITECT IS NOT AP ARTY, INTO 
A LEGALLY UNDEFINED DUTY OF THE ARCH-
ITECT (COURT DOES NOT SAY WHETHER CON-
TRACT OR TORT) TO ANSWER FOR THE MISFEAS-
ANCE OF THE CONTRACTOR WHEREIN NO ARCH-
ITECT'S SPECIFICATION WAS REQUESTED OR 
MADE AS TO THE MANNER OF EXCAVATING THE 
OPEN, VISIBLE TRENCH WHICH DID NOT COME 
WITHIN THE TORT LAW OF AN INHERENTLY DAN-
GEROUS SITUATION. 
(A) THE ARCHITECT'S POWERS OF SUPERVI-
SION AS OWNER'S AGENT ARE EXPRESSLY LIM-
ITED BY PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE ARCHITECT'S 
OWN AGREEMENT IN PRIVITY WITH THE OWNERS 
(WHICH PARAGRAPH THE COURT OVERLOOKS) 
TO BE EXERCISED ONLY UNDER THE SUPERIOR 
CONTROL OF THE ENGINEERS OF THE OWNERS, 
AND NOT UNILATERALLY. 
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(B) THE CONTRACTOR EXPRESSLY AGREES TO 
PROVIDE SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR WORKMEN. 
THE ARCHITECT DOES NOT. THE ARCHITECT'S 
SUBSCRIBED AGREEMENT DOES NOT AGREE TO 
ANSWER FOR THE DEFAULT OF THE CONTRAC-
TOR. THE ARCHITECT'S AGREEMENT WITH THE 
OWNERS CONAINS NO REFERENCE TO WORK 
STOPPAGE. 
It is elementary contract law that a party, in this case 
the architect, should be bound only by the terms, intent 
and understanding of its subscribed agency agreement 
and the Court should not broaden the architect's duties 
to a special unilateral duty of supervision forbidden by 
paragraph 13 of the architect's agency agreement regard-
ing a work stoppage, if any. 
The Court quotes paragraphs 1 and 7 of the architect's 
agreement with the owners, but completely overlooks 
paragraph 13 on the specific point at issue with its ex-
press words of limitation upon the authority and duties 
of the agent architect. It reads: 
13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will repre-
sent the owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with 
respect to this agreement, and the Architect shall 
perform and conduct all required services under his 
direction and supervision and shall submit his reports 
of study, drawings, design, details, specifications and 
recommendations to him for City approval, as well as 
all shop drawings, change orders, estimates for pay-
ment to Contractor, as required. (Italics added for 
emphasis.) 
The foregoing limitations of authority and enumeration 
of duties requiring the Architect to "perform and conduct 
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all required services under" the "direction and super-
vision" of the City Engineer is reinforced by paragraph 
3 (b) of the General Conditions Section of the Specifica-
tions which reads in part, that the architect, 
Will direct the supervision of construction and is act-
ing in cooperation with the City Engineer and Coun-
ty Engineer as outlined above in paragraph 3 and 
3(a). (R.148). 
The Court overlooks the foregoing limitations and def-
initions of duty plainly spelled out in the architect's agen-
cy agreement denying any unilateral action by the Arch-
itect in any situation of claimed right to stop the work 
"due to circumstances-that may be construed to be dan-
gerous." The Court quotes a consent provision regarding 
work stoppage found in the contractor's contract with the 
Owners to which the Architect is not a contracting party. 
It reads in part as follows: 
"If, in the judgement of the Architect and/or the , 
City Engineer or County Engineer it is necessary to 
close down the work-due to circumstances-that 
may be considered to be dangerous", etc. 
When paragraph 13 of the architect's agreement is laid 
alongside the above conflicting consent statement in the 
contractor's contract, the controlling question is, 
Which should determine the architect's duty: The sub-
scribed agency agreement of the architect with its stip-
ulated limitations of authority and duty, or the said con-
tractor's consent in its contract with the owners to which 
the architect is not in privity? 
The above question should be answered by applying 
the law of agency. This means that the agent's contract 
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must be construed against the particular fact situation. It 
should be emphasized that any attempted stopping of 
work of the contractor by the owners, "on the recom-
mendation of the Architect," would require the exercise 
of discretionary judgement regarding an extraordinary, 
non-customary and unusual act and would create a con-
troversia 1 situation where no definitive specifications 
exist. It is elementary egency law in cases involving ex-
traordinary action that the agent must act strictly within 
the express limitations of his authority. 
The law of agency requires that "effect must be given 
to every word and clause of the agent's agreement. 
Mechem on Agency Vol. 1, 1914, Secs. 768 and 776. A gen-
eral agency to "supervise the work" or "all phases of the 
work" is not an unlimited agency. Ibid., Mechem, Sec. 
714. An agent cannot increase his authority and duties by 
his representations to a third party, such as the contractor 
in the Nauman case, that he has broader authority than 
he in fact possesses under the limitations of his agency 
agreement, paragraph 13. Ibid., Mechem, Secs. 755 and 
757. 
The Court correctly finds that 
The method of construction was a matter solely 
under the control of the contractor, and the defend-
ant had no right to interfere with the contractor's 
execution of the work. 
However, the Court erroneously concludes that: 
"The defendant had a right to insist that the work be 
carried on in a safe manner." This statement is in error 
because in the matter of work stoppage the agent's agree-
14 
ment limits the architect to "study and recommendation 
to the City Engineer for City approval." 
The foregoing statement of the Court on a duty of the 
architect to insure a safe manner of excavation is good 
law only where an inherently or intrinsically dangerous 
situation exists as was the case in Miller V. DeWitt, infra, 
and in withdrawal of lateral support from an adjacent 
building as was true in the Erhart case, infra. In all other 
situations the manner, means and method of carrying on 
the work is the exclusive domain of the independent con-
tractor, unless a clearly intended third party agreement 
containing definitive specifications can be found as was 
found by the special, added, architect's agreement in the 
Erhart case. 
The Court then completely and unjustifiably overlooks 
the clearly stated terms of authority and duty of para-
graph 13 of the architect's agreement, Exhibit "A". The 
Court imposes a different agency contract on the arch-
itect. 
The opinion reads in part: 
We are of the opinion that if the defendant knew or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have known 
that the trench was unsafe either by reason of the 
contractor's failure to properly shore the walls of the 
trench or by its failure to slope the sides of the trench 
in such a manner as to make the excavation a safe 
place to work, the defendant had the right and the 
corresponding duty to stop the work until the unsafe 
condition has been remedied. 
There are several things wrong with this reasoning and 
conclusions: 
15 
First: The conclusion of the Court makes an agreement 
for the architect which was not intended as, and is not the 
architect's agency agreement, and under the special facts 
of this case is contrary to the express limitations upon the 
architect's right and scope of supervision as the owner's 
agent which is spelled out by paragraph 13 of the arch-
itect's subscribed agreement. 
Second: In the history of contract law, discretionary 
options create rights but not contract duties. 
Third: The Court's newly made agreement for the 
architect is impracticable of enforcement. Just suppose a 
practical case which does not involve any detailed speci-
fication by the Architect. 
There is then no standard of action of a definite thing 
to be done by the Contractor, since there are no specifica-
tions of sloping and/ or shoring specified by the architect 
before the work is done. Suppose that during the excavat-
ing of the open trench the Architect says to the contrac-
tor: 
"I order you to stop work, in my judgement your 
combination of sloping and shoring does not provide 
a safe place for workmen." 
The contractor replies: 
"In my judgement it is safe. You haven't made any 
detailed specifications as to the manner of sloping or 
shoring which I shall follow, my contract leaves that 
to my discretion and judgement. I have done the ex-
cavation this way for an eighth of a mile and there 
is no evidence to indicate that my present methods of 
excavating are unsafe." 
How will the architect enforce his supposed judgement 
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about an unsafe condition? Will he have to go to a court 
for an injunction? How long will it take the Court to de-
termine whether the condition of the open trench in 
which no accident has occurred and regarding which 
there are no specifications is a safe or an unsafe condition 
for workmen? What happens while the litigation goes on? 
Are we not in no man's land of impracticability? Does not 
this simple illustration demonstrate that unless there are 
definitive specifications as to the manner of shoring as is 
found in the Erhart Case, infra, that the Court should not 
do judicial legislating in such fact situation, but should 
decide the case on the traditional law governing archi-
tects? Before holding the architect in any way responsible 
for the methods and procedures used by the contractor, 
the Court should require definiteness of contract by re-
quiring the existence of detailed specifications to which 
the Contractor agrees to conform. This would give va-
lidity and enforceability to intended and understood con-
tract provisions. 
Historically, the architect is not responsible, but the 
contractor is responsible for construction means, methods, 
techniques, sequences, procedures and for safety pre-
cautions and programs in connection with the work. The 
excavation of a trench is not a part of the materials to be 
incorporated into the completed building and, therefore, 
no specifications are provided unless a special architect's 
agreement is made to define the methods to be used by 
the contractor. 
The architect's responsibility to the owners is only with 
the materials and workmanship incorporated into the 
finished building. The excavation of an open trench is 
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only a preparatory step necessarily taken by the Con-
tractor in order to place the specified materials in their 
proper location. 
Fourth: The Courts conclusion is in error because the 
standard of care is not that of the defendant architect but 
that of architects practicing in the vicinity as briefed in 
POINT Ilsupra. 
Fifth: The Courts conclusion is unsupportable law be-
cause in legal and practical effect it makes the architect 
an insurer of all workmen on building projects who may 
be injured or killed. Surely the Court will not insist that 
architects must be insurers of the safety of workmen par-
ticularly where the architect has not been specially em-
ployed to prepare detailed specifications and where the 
work is not inherently dangerous. 
Sixth: The Court's conclusion makes the rule of res 
ipsa locquitur and not that of forseeability applicable by 
its decision. At what point or degree of safeness, by the 
Court's theoretical and nebulous measure of safety, does 
the unsafe condition of the open trench occur? In the 
absence of definitive specifications as to the degree of 
sloping or of the kind and extent of shoring required the 
test of an unsafe condition is the condition that existed 
when the accident occurred, because the accident would 
not have happened unless there were an unsafe condition. 
Thus the "if" conclusion of the Court uses the rejected 
"but for" test of causation on the facts of this case. 
Seventh: The contract without privity which the Court 
makes for the architect is to answer for the default or 
misconduct of the contractor and is not subscribed by the 
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architect as is required by the Statute of Frauds in such 
cases, and as was found in Erhart, infra. 
Eighth: The Court's "if" statement of law standing by 
itself is not good law because it leaves no room for honest 
mistake of judgement by the architect, which the cases 
regarding liability for discretionary judgement allow. See 
the Paxton Case, infra, page 938 andDay V. National U. s. 
Radiator Corporation 241 La. 283, 128 So. 660 upholding 
this rule of allowable mistake. 
POINT V 
EVERY ONE OF THE APPELLATE COURT DECI-
SIONS CITED BY THE COURT FOR SUPPORT OF ITS 
HUMANITARIAN, PUBLIC POLICY VIEW WERE 
DECIDED BY APPLYING THE RULE OF STARE 
DECISIS. BOTH ERHART AND PAXTON WERE DE-
CIDED ON THEIR SPECIAL FACT SITUATIONS CON-
TRARY TO THE COURT'S REASONING. 
(A) THE ERHART CASE, INFRA, WAS DECIDED 
ON AFFIRMATIVE TORT FEASANCE OF THE ARCH-
ITECT'S AGENT, ALTHOUGH THE COURT ALSO 
FINDS A SPECIAL THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
CONTRACT ON THE FACTS. 
(B) THE PAXTON CASE, INFRA, WAS DECIDED 
ON THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE ARCHITECT AS 
SUPERVISING AGENT TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE 
WITH HIS SPECIFICATION FOR A SAFE QUALITY 
OF SHEATHING (ALTHOUGH THE ARCHITECT 
WAS HELD NOT LIABLE ON DEFECTIVE PLEAD-
ING). 
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(C) THE MILLER V. DEWITT CASES, INFRA, 
WERE DECIDED ON THE TRADITIONAL TORT DOC-
TRINE OF ABSOLUTE TORT LIABILITY WHEN 
DEALING WITH AN INHERENTLY DANGEROUS OR 
ULTRA-HAZARDOUS FACT SITUATION EXISTING 
BEFORE ANY WORK WAS DONE. 
Erhart v. Hammond 232 Ark. 133, 334 S. W. 869 was 
decided by a majority of two judges to 1 (2 judges not 
participating). The facts and law of this case are clearly 
distinguishable from and do not support the court's de-
cision in this Nauman case, nor does the Erhart decision 
depart from the traditional law of tort or contract. 
The first reason why the Erhart case is not in point and 
does not support the opinion in the Nauman case is that 
the plaintiff in Erhart pleaded a tort action for affirma-
tive misfeasance of defendant architects on which the 
verdict for plaintiff was found to be supported by the 
evidence. The Arkansas Supreme Court sets out a stip-
ulation of the parties and part of the pleading of the arch-
itect's tort of misfeasance as follows: 
The architect stipulated that "Davenport was their 
agent, servant and employee and acting within the 
scope of his employment on the J. C. Penney Com-
pany job site at the time of (the cave in) and prior 
thereto." (Material in parenthesis added.) 
The complaint in Erhart alleged "that the agent of 
the architect had negligently driven a 4600 pound 
vehicle onto the damp earth adjacent to the point of 
cave-in contributing to the cave-in and resulting 
damage and deaths." 
The second reason why the Erhart case does not sup-
port this court's opinion is because the court found a spe-
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cial third party beneficiary contract to answer for the 
default of the contractor if the architects failed to en-
force their detailed, unequivocal specifications for shoring 
of the trench, and there was an inherently dangerous 
situation of temporary excavation adjacent to buildings. 
The special facts in Erhart were in part, that the arch-
itects intentionally signed a second and separate contract 
for "$12,000.00 additional fee over and above their arch-
itectural fee' (p. 869 supra.). 
By the terms of this special contract the architects 
agreed to draw up detailed specifications regarding the 
shoring which the contractor must do in excavating the 
temporary trench on the J. C. Penney job, "due to the 
depth of the excavation and danger to adjacent buildings 
and workmen". Also by the terms of the said special con-
tract the architects expressly agreed to supervise the 
method and manner of installing that shoring and to en-
force the requirements of their detailed specifications. 
The Arkansas Supreme court found that Erhart's com-
plaint alleged that the specifications dictating the manner 
of shoring by the contractor "were set out in some detail 
in the" (special, additional) "contract." (Italics added for 
emphasis.) 
Erhart's complaint then alleges that the architects did 
not police the contractor's method and manner of install-
and maintaining the shoring according to their said spe-
cifications which neglect proximately caused injury to 
one and death of the other three workmen. (Italics added 
for emphasis.) 
We point out that Justice Ward in his dissenting opin-
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ion accurately characterized the legal nature of the arch-
itect's subscribed, special, supervisory agreement to an-
swer for the default of the contractor. 
He wrote: 
The prime contractor under the terms of the contract 
was specifically charged with the duties which the 
majority would impose on appellants. 
The factual differences which made the Erhart Case, 
supra. not in point in the Nauman case are as follows: 
First, there was no agreement for a special fee, or at 
all, of the architect in the Nauman case to draw up writ-
ten specifications for the detailed manner of shoring the 
trench to be excavated. 
Second, no such specifications were anticipated by any-
one or made by the architect in the Nauman case. 
Third, the architect in the Nauman case did not inten-
tionally or knowingly or otherwise agree to supervise the 
method or manner of the contractor's excavation of the 
trench as was done by the architects in the special third 
party beneficiary contract in Erhart. 
Fourth, the excavation in the Erhart Case, supra, in-
volved "danger to adjacent buildings" which does come 
under the inherently dangerous tort doctrine. (Def's 
original brief POINT V, Restatement of torts Sec. 520 et. 
seq.) No such inherently dangerous situation is pleaded 
in the Nauman Case. 
Fifth, The contractor in the Nauman case did not agree 
to comply with architect's specifications for the shoring 
and/or sloping of the trench. In Erhart the contractor 
agreed to conform to the detailed specifications for shor-
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ing the trench which the architects specially agreed to 
inforce. 
Sixth, in the Nauman case the manner and method of 
excavation was left entirely to the discression and control 
of the contractor as stated by the Court in the first sen-
tence of the next to the last paragraph of its opinion. 
This was not true in the Erhart Case. In the Nauman case 
the architect did not have any unilateral option right or 
duty to close down the work within its discressionary 
judgement but was limited to study and make recom-
mendation on any question of work stoppage by para-
graph 13 of its agreement on supervision (entirely over-
looked by the Court). 
The case of Paxton v. Alameda County 119 Cal. 2d 393. 
259 P. 2d 934 does not support the Court's opinion in the 
Nauman case. We thought we made this point perfectly 
clear in our original brief (p. 32-33). We agree with the 
Paxton Case because it is reasoned on the traditional rule 
that the supervisory duties of an architect are commen-
surate with and limited by a duty of enforcement of his 
definitive specifications. 
The material facts in Paxton were that the architect 
had provided specifications for a safe quality of sheathing 
on a flat roof that was to be later tarred and graveled. 
He saw inferior sheathing stored near the building being 
erected and neglected to enforce the use of safe better-
q uali ty sheathing which he had specified. The architect 
was held not liable because the defective pleading 
charged him only with making neglegent specifications 
and not with neglect to supervise and enforce his safe 
specifications. The inferior sheathing used allowed a 
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workman to fall through the roof from which serious 
injury resulted. 
A careful reading of the Paxton Case will disclose un-
disputably that the Court found: 
First, that the specifications for roof sheathing were 
safe according to the standard of architects practicing in 
the vicinity or community area where the defendant 
practiced and were not negligently drawn up. 
Second, that the general supervision clause required 
the architect only to exercise the reasonable prudence 
exercised by architects practicing in the said community 
area to secure safe sheathing on the roof as an end result 
according to the specifications which the architect had 
drafted and included in the contractor's contract. The 
governing point of the law of architects which the court 
completely overlooks in the Nauman case is that the spe-
cifications define the limit of duty of an architect's super-
visory duties. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois in the Miller case, infra, 
declared, 
As a general rule it has been said that the general 
duty to "supervise the work" merely creates a duty 
to see that the building when constructed meets the 
plans and specifications contracted for. Clinton v. 
Boehm, 124 N.Y.S. 789, 139 App. Div. 73; Garden City 
Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P. 2d 352, 356; 
Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corp. 241 La. 288, 
128 So. 660, 666. 
It must be admitted that in both the Erhart Case and 
in the Paxton Case, those Court's, by decision in the first, 
and by dicta in the second (since the architect was not 
24 
held liable in the Paxton CaseQ were founded on the tra-
ditional line of demarcation in the law of architects that 
the architect is liable only for negligent failure to require 
compliance with his specifications, except where the law 
of a tortious misfeasance as in Erhart or the law of tort 
governing an inherently or ultra hazardous situation as 
in the Miller cases applies to and governs the fact situa-
tion. 
The two opinions in Miller v. DeWitt, first by the inter-
mediate appellate court in 59 Ill. app. 2nd 38, 208 N.E. 2d 
249 and second in the unpublished opinion of the Illinois 
Supreme Court, were properly decided on the traditional 
tort doctrine of inherently dangerous situation requiring 
ultra hazardous activity. This is proved by the following 
quotations from the Miller opinions. The intermediate 
appellate Court's analysis and conclusions were: 
The particular, immediate matter which was in-
volved was not simple, minor, unimportant, or in-
consequential routine, non-vital, day to day detail. , 
The removal of the north-south proscenium truss and 
the north end columns and the temporary support 
stay or shoring of the west end of each of the old 
four west end trusses pending installation of the pro-
posed new north-south main bearing truss were high-
ly important serious vital steps in the whole con-
struction process to be done once and once only. The 
west ends of those old west-east trusses had to be 
temporarily supported and shored. The job could not 
be accomplished without doing so. And the nature of 
the particular matter involved was such that it did 
not admit any of on-the job experimentation, trial 
and error correction, approximations or mistakes. If 
one significant mistake or miscalculation occurred in 
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the adequacy of the supports, stays or shoring a col-
lapse would inevitably occur. There could be no sec-
ond opportunity to do something else. There could be 
::10 rectification. The supports, stays, columns or 
towers had to be correct-not about correct-and 
they had to be correct the first time. There would be 
no second time. The matter was inherently complex, 
delicate and hazardous. (p. 286.) (Italics added.) 
The Supreme Court of Illinois stated: 
Here it appears that the shoring and removal of part 
of the old gymnasium roof was a major part of the 
entire remodeling situation and one that involved 
obvious hazards. (p. 8.) 
From the above quotations, the conclusion follows that 
the decisions in the Miller cases rest on accepted tort 
law of absolute liability in dealing with an inherently 
dangerous fact situation requiring ultra hazardous activ-
ity which did not exist in the temporary, open, visible 
trench in the Nauman case. 
A second clear distinction is that the Court finds in the 
Miller cases that the Illinois legislature had passed a third 
party liability act, the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1963, ch. 48, paragraphs 60, 69) which provide a sta-
tutory imposed duty on supervising architects to require 
adequate enforcement of safe shoring by the contractor in 
"inherently complex, delicate and hazardous situations" 
known to be such because of the inherently dangerous 
situation to be dealt with by the architect (pp. 8-9). There 
is no statutory imposed duty under the facts of the Nau-
man case. 
We observe that the opinion of the Utah Supreme 
26 
Court, without mentioning an inherently dangerous sit-
uation or a statutory imposed liability (not applicable to 
the Nauman case) , adopts some of the language from the 
unnecessary, obiter dicta of the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Miller V. DeWitt, supra. 
If there existed in the Nauman case an inherently dan-
gerous fact situation under traditional tort law and/or a 
statutory liability under the workmen's compensation act 
of Utah or some other statute, then the unnecessary obiter 
dicta language of the next to the paragraph of the Court's 
opinion would be harmless. That would be so because the 
case would then be decided on proper legal grounds ap-
plied to the particular fact situation. 
But we respectfully submit that the Court should give 
effect to paragraph 13 of the written agreement of the 
architect which was pleaded in Exhibit 1 attached to 
plaintiff's complaint but overlooked by this Court. It 
reads: 
13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will represent 
the owner, Salt Lake City Corporation, with respect 
to the agreement, and the architect shall perform and 
conduct all required services under his direction and 
supervision and shall submit his reports of study-
and recommendations to him for City approval. 
(Italics added.) 
A third material and controlling difference between the 
facts of the Nauman Case and the Miller v. De Witt Case, 
supra, is the difference in the language of the agency 
agreements of the respective architects. In paragraph 1 
of the architect's agreement in the Miller Case is found 
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only a general agreement for "supervision of the work." 
The architect's agreement in that case does not contain a 
special contractual statement of limitations upon the au-
thority and duties of the architect in the matter of "SU-
PERVISION" as is found in paragraph 13 specially deal-
ing with that subject in the Nauman case. As stated 
earlier that agreement places clearly stated limitations 
upon the scope of authority and upon the duties of the 
architect in supervision of the extraordinary and non-
customary act of a work coppage, if any. 
POINT VI 
THE CONTRACTOR'S CONSENT TO THE OWNERS 
AND /OR THE OWNER'S AGENT ARCHITECT FOR A 
WORK STOPPAGE IS STATED TO BE DISCRETION-
ARY IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE PERSONS 
NAMED. THIRD PARTY CONSENT CANNOT LEGAL-
LY CHANGE THE LIMITATIONS ON THE ARCHI-
TECT'S DUTIES REGARDING ANY WORK STOP-
PAGE. 
PARAGRAPH 13 OF THE ARCHITECT'S AGENCY 
AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY RESTRICTS THE ARCH-
ITECT TO STUDY AND A DISCRETIONARY RECOM-
MENDATION TO THE OWNERS, WHO MAY THEN 
ACT OR NOT TO STOP THE WORK IN THEIR DIS-
CRETION AND JUDGEMENT. AN HONEST MISTAKE 
OF JUDGEMENT DOES NOT CREATE LIABILITY. 
Traditional construction of contracts and also of third 
party consent paragraphs where there is no privity of 
contract would require that all of the material phrases be 
given their due weight to determine the intent and rights 
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and duties of the contracting parties. 
Assuming for sake of argument, without admitting that 
a third party consent without contract privity may over-
ride the architect's paragraph 13 on SUPERVISION. It 
is one thing to allow plaintiff's attorney Donn E. Cassity 
to impose a judgement upon the defendant architect to 
close down the work by use of the general term "hazard-
ous", and another thing entirely for the court to hold to 
established law, that if architects practicing in the vicin-
ity would have made a judgement that the work should 
be closed down, and the defendant architect failed to 
make such a recommendation to the owners as required 
in his agreement, paragraph 13, then a legal basis for 
liability might be found. 
The cases hold that where discretionary judgement is 
allowed, honest mistake of judgement does not create 
liability. 
The Paxton case, supra, states of the architect's speci-
fications for sheathing 
These computations he made in compliance with ac-
tual building law and in accordance with the stand-
ards of good practice in his profession and his com-
munity. That we think would negative any basis for 
a finding of negligence even if he had made some 
mistakes in his computation and there is no evidence 
he made such mistakes. (p. 938.) (Italics added.) 
The case of Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corporation 
241 La. 288 128 So. 660 grants immunity from liability of 
public officers and architects acting on a public project 
where invested with discretionary judgement, unless the 
plaintiff pleads "willfulness, malice or corruption in the 
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conduct of the owner or architect." 
From the foregoing law on discretionary judgements, 
it appears that the Court errs in its too broadly stated 
sentence in the next to the last paragraph of the Courts 
opinion, to which Justice Henroid dissents. That ques-
tioned statement of law precludes non-liability for an 
honest mistake of a discretionary judgement. We believe 
the court inadvertently overlooked the law governing 
non-liability for honest mistake of judgement and should 
declare that law applicable on rehearing. 
The direct and primary cause of the alleged accident is 
the negligence of the Contractor clearly assumed by him 
in his subscribed contract. Any alleged negligence of the 
architect is of secondary or passive nature-failure to 
detect negligence of contractor and recommend work 
stoppage to the owners if that be his honest discretionary 
judgement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing analysis supports the following conclu-
sions: 
First, The opinion is much too short to properly con-
sider the applicable law of architects against the partic-
ular background of the instant fact-situation as is done by 
all the cases cited by the Court. 
Second, The immunity from liability granted to third 
parties by the 1945 amendment to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act should be applied to defendant architect 
unless the architect made a third party beneficiary con-
tract waving that immunity. The Court should find no 
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such third party beneficiary contract. 
Third, The Court erred in failing to hold that the com. 
plaint was fatally defective on the ground that the com-
plaint did not plead a customary duty and failure to 
exercise the standard of care in the matter of discretion-
ary work stoppage by architects practicing in the vicinity 
where the question of liability of the architect was in-
volved. 
Fourth, The Court engaged in unjustifiable judicial 
legislation because under the particular facts and ap-
plicable traditional law there are no intersticies or gaps 
to be filled in by the Court. 
Fifth, The Court imposes upon architects and private 
and municipal property owners engaged in building proj-
ects the unjustibiable position of insurers of all workmen 
against injury and the heirs of workmen against death of 
workmen by misfeasance of the building contractor. This 
unjustifiable result is founded on unnecessary obiter dicta 
of the Illinois appellate opinions in Miller V. DeWitt, 
supra, which case was decided on the accepted tort doc-
trine of inherently dangerous situation requiring ultra-
hazardous activity, and upon a statutory imposed duty by 
the Illinois Structural Work Act of 1963. 
Sixth, The Court erred in failing to recognize the ex-
press terms of limitation upon the architects supervisory 
activities spelled out in paragraph 13 of the architect's 
agency agreement which the Court overlooks, although 
pleaded in Exhibit "A" of plaintiff's complaint, which re-
quires the discretionary judgement of the City Engineer 
as to whether the contractor's work should be stopped on 
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study and recommendation of the architect, or on the 
owners own initiative. 
Seventh, The architect should not be bound to answer 
for the default or misconduct of the contractor except 
upon the written contract subscribed by the architect 
coming within the statute of frauds or upon established 
tort law as found in the Erhart and Miller cases. 
Eighth, The cases cited by the Court were each one de-
cided upon traditional legal grounds of the law of arch-
itects. The Paxton and Erhart cases were decided by ap-
plying the general rule of law that a general agreement 
of an architect to become the supervising agent of the 
owner requires only that the architect enforce his defin-
itive specifications and also by the application of the ap-
plicable tort law governing misfeasance of an architect's 
servant in Erhart. 
Ninth, The Court's opinion does not allow an honest 
mistake of judgement by the architect in his study and 
recommendation to the City Engineer, on any work stop-
page, which is allowed by the traditional law of archi-
tects. 
Tenth, The decision in the Nauman case makes the 
architect the unlimited insurer of the safety of all work-
men who are injured or killed on construction work, 
created by acts or omissions of the contractor whose li-
ability for injuries or death is limited by Workmen's 
Compensation Laws. The obligations of an insurer should 
not be imposed by judicial decision. 
WHEREFORE we respectfully submit that upon re-
hearing and reconsideration, the Court should apply tra-
32 
ditionally established law of architects to the unique facts 
of the Nauman case. 
Done this 
1:l. 
:lt>- day of May, 1967. 
A. Ladru Jensen 
1536 Harvard Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Ronald C. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
